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ABSTRACT
We examine schoolchildren’s reasoning with spatial relations, such as ‘is to
the left of’. Our aims are to obtain a more precise account of the effect of
working memory on reasoning, a more detailed understanding of the internal
representation of mental models and a developmental perspective. We dis-
cuss two experiments in which 348 children, between eight and twelve years
old, needed to verify conclusions for 24 reasoning problems describing the
spatial relations between pieces of clothing. In both experiments, children in
the experimental condition were allowed to take notes by means of paper
and pencil. We find that the participants spontaneously draw iconic represen-
tations of the items’ spatial ordering, have a strong preference for only con-
sidering one possible state of affairs even when more are relevant, and that
an explanation in terms of working memory capacity alone cannot fully
explain the data.
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Developmental accounts of reasoning come in different flavours. One
strand of theories focusses on the syntactic aspect of reasoning. This
includes computationalist accounts, ultimately going back to the work of
Fodor (1975, 1983), explaining relational reasoning as symbolic reasoning.
Alternatively, but still in the syntactic camp, explanations in terms of pro-
portional reasoning are grounded in Inhelder and Piaget (1958)’s concept
of formal operational reasoning. A third group of syntactically focussed the-
ories is that of the mental logic theories, rooted in work of Braine (1978)
and Rips (1983). In contrast to these syntactically focussed theories, mental
model theory (cf. Johnson-Laird, 1983, 2006) is more semantically focussed,
and particularly well suited to deal with reasoning with spatial relations.
Hence, we will use its framework as our theoretical point of departure.
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Mental model theory says that reasoners mentally construct representations
that are iconic to the information they have processed. Consider, for
example, the following premise.
The hat is to the left of the shirt
This can be represented by the mental model below.
H S
Keeping such models in mind taxes working memory and the more com-
plex they are, the more will be demanded in terms of working memory. For
example, consider the following premise being added to the information.
The jacket is to the right of the shirt
Reasoners will not keep the premises in mind, but, according to the prin-
ciple of economicity (Cf. Manktelow, 1999), incrementally add the informa-
tion in the premises to their mental model. In this case, this is still relatively
simple, as only one model representation is consistent with this
information:
H S J
On the other hand, consider the following premise to be the third piece
of information.
The cap is to the right of the shirt
Now at least two different representations can be constructed.
H S J C and H S C J
Both are consistent with the premises. Anyone realising this and repre-
senting these possibilities mentally, needs to invest more working memory
effort than someone only representing one of both. In fact, it has convin-
cingly been shown (Goodwin & Johnson-Laird, 2005; Jahn et al., 2007;
Ragni et al., 2007) that reasoners by default only do construct one of both,
the explanation being that this is done because of parsimonious use of
working memory. In general, working memory capacity is known to limit
reasoning capability (Cf. Bara et al., 1995; Gilhooly et al., 1992; Klauer, 1997).
What is currently lacking, is a precise account of the effect of working
memory, more detailed understanding of the internal representation of
mental models and a developmental perspective. The argument by Wright
(2001) that ‘the issue of how and when children are able to handle transi-
tive inference remains unsettled’ (p.385) still holds today. To obtain the
developmental perspective, we have chosen children in different age
groups as participants for our experiments. For more insight in their
internal representation and a more specific understanding of the effect of
working memory capacity, we allow them to use paper and pencil in the
experimental condition. The assumption that reasoners who are given
paper and pencil will write down something that matches their mental rep-
resentations to some extent, has been made earlier by, for example, Van
der Henst et al. (2002) and Bucciarelli and Johnson-Laird (1999). Moreover,
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taking notes by means of paper and pencil can be an auxiliary to remember
things and thus, alleviate the weight on working memory, as explained by
Bauer and Johnson-Laird (1993). In order to maximise this effect of the
working memory aid, it also makes sense to try this kind of experiment
with participants that are known to have limited working memory, i.e. chil-
dren (see Gathercole et al., 2004). At the same time, we should be ascer-
tained that participants have the ability to conduct the type of reasoning
exercises we want to present them. Our participants ranged from eight- to
twelve-year olds. This is certainly old enough to deal with transitive infer-
ences (see Andrews & Halford, 1998; Pears & Bryant, 1990), even taking into
account that ‘young children (e.g., of 4 or 5 years) can reason transitively
but not as logically underpinned’ (Wright, 2001, p.414). Moreover, the link
between a spatial mental model and reality is tight. Depicting a relation
such as ‘is to the left of’ is simple and intuitive by putting it to the left of
the other item in the relationship. At the same time, our chosen age group
is young enough to have more limited working memory capacity than
adults. As ‘to the left/right of’ is the only relation we question, combined
with ‘above/below’ in the premises, this is an investigation into these spe-
cific spatial relations more than it is an investigation into transitive reason-
ing in general. The ability to judge whether a relation is transitive or not
hardly comes into play, while this should be part of general transitive rea-
soning research, as described by Wright (2001). Compared to basic three-
term transitive reasoning (where on the basis of two premises, like A< B
and B<C the relation between two mentioned items must be inferred, like
A ? C), the task in our experiment was more complex, as it involved under-
standing multiple possibilities. Also at least three premises, i.e. four terms,
were required, for the MMv problems. Even when working with blocks
instead of text, this proved to be more difficult for younger children (cf.
Markovits et al., 1995) than basic two-premise problems. Finally, our experi-
mental setup was one that essentially involved reading of the premises
and note taking. Hence, fluent reading skills were required. This explains
why we considered third-graders to be the youngest possible age group
for this experiment. We erred on the side of caution by choosing fourth-
graders for the first experiment, to ascertain that the task was not too dif-
ficult for the younger group. With sixth-graders as older group, we were
still focussing on children rather than adolescents and remained within
the Piagetian concrete operational stage. As such, our age group comple-
ments lots of research that has been done on slightly younger children or
children matching our youngest group (cf. Ameel et al., 2007; Andrews &
Halford, 1998; Markovits et al., 1995; Pears & Bryant, 1990; Wright &
Smailes, 2015).
If children’s reasoning performance is impaired because of limited work-
ing memory, and we provide them with a mechanism, i.e. taking notes, to
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overcome this limitation, we would expect the result to be a significant
improvement of reasoning performance. Moreover, we would expect a clear
effect for the cases with multiple possibilities, as these put the heaviest
load on working memory. That is, unless the bias to construct only one sin-




We tested 216 children. There were 106 boys and 110 girls; 120 sixth-
graders (M¼ 11.48 years; SD ¼ 0.28) and 96 fourth-graders (M¼ 9.47 years;
SD ¼ 0.28). All data was collected at schools in Flanders. All children’s data
was anonymized before processing. The experiment was approved by the
social and societal ethics committee of KU Leuven and all participating chil-
dren had an informed consent signed by their parents.1 Among the fourth-
graders, 55 children were assigned to the control condition and 41 to the
experimental condition. Among the sixth-graders, 65 and 55 children were
in the control and experimental condition, respectively.
Procedure
The experiment leader collected the data per class. Each class as a whole
was assigned to either the experimental or control condition. During the
data collection, she followed a script to ensure that the same instructions
were given in each class. Before handing the exercises to the children, she
introduced the topic by collectively solving a real life example of the type
of problem they were to encounter in the exercises. The example consisted
of describing the relative positions of real pieces of clothing, for which no
prior expectations could be assumed, and inferring information from that.
She showed that a sweater was to the right of a pair of trousers and a cap
was to the right of the sweater. Then she agreed with the children that the
cap was also to the right of the trousers. The children were instructed that
if they thought there was no correct answer, there were multiple possibil-
ities or they did not know, they should choose the answer option ‘none of
the above’. We will discuss this option in more detail later. Furthermore,
they were instructed that they would not receive any grade on the test but
also told that we needed them to do their best in order to be able to com-
pare the data with those of other children. Once the introduction was over,
they each received their exercise sheets and could start working
individually.
1The reference number of the ethics committee approval is G-2017 11 970.
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Material
All children received 24 reasoning problems. These consisted of premises
describing relative positions of pieces of clothing, on the basis of which
they had to draw a conclusion that could be chosen from multiple
choice options.
There were three problem types. The first problem type, single model
problems (M1), consisted of premises that describe an unambiguous
arrangement of items. Hence, for all of these problems it was possible to
infer what the relation between the question items was and the answer
was either option a or option b. Here is an example of a single model prob-
lem, translated to English from the Dutch original. In Dutch all nouns
were singular.
The trousers are to the left of the cap.
The skirt is to the left of the trousers.
Where are the skirt and the cap relative to each other?
a. The skirt is to the right of the cap
b. The cap is to the right of the skirt
c. None of the above
The correct, unambiguous mental model that can be constructed for
these premises is
S T C
The second problem type, multiple-model problems with a valid conclu-
sion (MMv), consisted of premises that describe a situation consistent with
two different arrangements of items, but posed a question on items that
had the same relation in both of these representations. Thus, for these
problems, too, the correct left-right relation between the question items
could be inferred. It is important to realise that these problems could be
answered correctly by constructing only one of the two possible represen-
tations and judging the conclusion based on that one model, possibly with-
out even realising that multiple possible representations are involved. Add
‘the jacket is to the left of the trousers’ as third premise to the example
above. The result is a description of a situation where the jacket can be
either left or right of the skirt, but this does not matter for the question at
hand, as in both possible representations, the skirt is to the left of the cap.
J S T C and S J T C
Finally, the third problem type were multiple-model problems with no
valid conclusion (MMnv). In these problems, premises also described a situ-
ation consistent with two different arrangements of items, but now a ques-
tion was posed on items that had a different relation in both of these
representations. No valid conclusion could be inferred from these premises
so the correct answer to these problems was always option c, ‘none of the
above’. To obtain such a problem, again add ‘the jacket is to the left of the
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trousers’ as third premise to the problem above, obtaining the same two
possible mental models, but now change the question to ‘where are the
skirt and the jacket relative to each other?’. As this relation is different in
each of the two models, a valid conclusion is not possible.
Next to these one-dimensional problems, there were also two-dimen-
sional ones, that also included the relations ‘is above’ and ‘is below’. The
question, however, was always on a left-right relation. Half of the problems
were two-dimensional, counterbalanced with problem type. Two-dimen-
sional problems always had four premises. One dimensional problems had
two premises for the M1 and MMnv problems and three premises for the
MMv problems, which are not possible to construct with two premises only.
As there was no significant main effect of dimension, nor any significant
interaction with dimension, in both experiments, it is safe to conclude that
two-dimensional problems were of comparable complexity and difficulty to
the one-dimensional problems. To avoid overcomplicating the results,
dimension has been left out of the reported analyses.
There were five different items (the skirt, the jacket, the trousers, the
sweater, the cap), which were re-used for all problems. Each child solved
eight M1 problems, eight MMv problems and eight MMnv problems.
Problems were presented in different randomised orders. In the experimen-
tal condition, there was blank space (7 cm x 16 cm) below the question and
answer options, where the children could write or draw what they wanted.
We did not provide instructions on how to use this space. The experiment
leader only mentioned ‘you can take notes if you think this can help you’.
In the control condition, there was no blank space and children were not
allowed to take notes, which was checked by the experiment leader.
Results and discussion
Effect of type, notes and grade on accuracy
The data that support the findings of this study are openly available on
OSF.2 No data was excluded. We performed a multilevel analysis, predicting
scores from type, notes and grade including all their interactions, with indi-
vidual participants as random intercept.3 The R2 of the resulting model was
.38 (based on the theoretical variance) and .33 (based on the observation-
level variance via the delta method of Nakagawa et al., 2017). If we only
look at the fixed effects, the R2 estimates were .29 and .26, respectively.
Critically, there was a significant three-way interaction between notes,
grade, and problem type (v2(2) ¼ 12.81, p ¼ .002), but the pattern of results
was not one we had expected a priori (see Figure 1).
2https://osf.io/ukep3/
3We used the afex package (v 0.20.2) in R (v 3.4.3 (2017-11-30) “Kite-Eating Tree”)
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Taking notes proved to be beneficial for only two of the three problem
types. Both fourth- and sixth-graders performed significantly better on sin-
gle-model problems and multiple-model problems with valid conclusion
when given the opportunity to take notes. Surprisingly, they performed
worse on multiple-model problems without valid conclusion when allowed
to take notes. Moreover, compared to fourth-graders, sixth-graders showed
a stronger beneficial effect of note taking on multiple-model problems with
valid conclusion, but also a stronger adverse effect of note taking on mul-
tiple-model problems without valid conclusion (see Tables 1 and 2).
More detailed analysis of the note taking
The children in the notes condition had the opportunity to take notes, but
not all of them took advantage of this. We coded the notes that were
taken, with the following results. Overall, notes were taken for 80% of all
problems, with 74% for the fourth-graders and 85% for the sixth-graders.
Most of the time, participants took notes for all problems, as can be seen in
Figure 1. Experiment 1 mean scores in percentages by notes group, grade and prob-
lem type.
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Figure 2. Whether notes were taken or not did not depend on problem
type (v2(2) ¼ 3.35, p ¼ .187), but did depend on problem order (v2(1) ¼
24.65, p < .001), as shown by multilevel analysis predicting amount of notes
taken by problem type and problem order, with individual participants as
random intercept. Less notes were taken on later problems, possibly
because some participants grew tired of taking notes throughout the
experiment. The type of notes taken were always spatial models of the
items, with the items represented mostly by words describing the pieces of
clothing, followed by drawings of the clothing, followed by a combination
of both and exceptionally initial letters or symbols, as can be seen in
Figure 3.
Of the notes taken, 73% were correct, i.e. the notes reflected the
information in the premises without mistakes, but possibly without being
complete. Fourth-graders took correct notes in 61% of the cases, while
sixth-graders did so in 81% of the cases. Of these correct notes, 93% were
complete (fourth-graders 85% and sixth-graders 97%), i.e, the notes fully
described a single mental model as described in the premises. Note that
this did not take into consideration information on multiple models. We
kept track of this separately. Of the 1224 occasions in which notes were
actually taken for multiple model problems, only six (i.e. only 0.49%)
showed information that we interpreted as representing multiple models,
with all 6 problems answered correctly. The comparison of the accuracy
scores between the cases in which notes were taken and those in which
notes were not taken showed a similar pattern as when comparing the
cases in which notes were allowed (the ‘notes’ condition) with those in
which notes were not allowed (the ‘no notes’ condition). The latter com-
parison was shown in Figure 1, while the former, exclusively with data
within the ‘notes’ condition, can be observed in Figure 4.
Whether the notes taken were correct or not significantly predicted the
score for the problems, in a mixed model predicting score from notes
Table 1. Effect of note taking for each problem type by grade combination.
Problem type Grade Estimate Standard error Z p
M1_v 6 1.05 0.19 5.39 < .001
MM_v 6 1.15 0.20 5.91 < .001
MM_nv 6 1.58 0.28 5.62 < .001
M1_v 4 0.79 0.21 3.72 < .001
MM_v 4 0.59 0.21 2.82 .005
MM_nv 4 0.82 0.23 3.57 < .001
Table 2. Differential effect of note taking across grade for each problem type.
Problem type Estimate Standard error Z p
M1_v 0.26 0.29 0.92 .356
MM_v 0.57 0.29 1.99 .046
MM_nv 0.76 0.36 2.09 .037
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correctness and problem type with individual participants as random inter-
cept (v2(1) ¼ 22.14, p < .001). There was also a significant interaction with
problem type (v2(2) ¼ 61.90, p < .001), which can be explained by the fact
that a correct, and even complete representation of an MMnv model does
Figure 2. Frequency distribution of total amount of notes taken in experiment 1.
Figure 3. Type of notes taken in experiment 1.
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not lead to a correct answer as long as there is no understanding of the
multiple possibilities. Multilevel analysis predicting note correctness from
grade and problem type, with individual participants as random intercept,
showed that sixth-graders had significantly more correct notes than fourth-
graders (v2(1) ¼ 9.19, p ¼ .002), as pictured in Figure 5.
Our interpretation of the results is that most children always constructed
just one model. This is in accordance with the claim (in Goodwin &
Johnson-Laird, 2005; Jahn et al., 2007; and Ragni et al., 2007) that, not only
children, but all reasoners in general by default build a single, simple, and
typical mental model but neglect other possible models. The children who
could take notes were better at this than the ones that could not and con-
sequently scored better on the M1 and MMv problems. However, for the
MMnv problems this was not the right strategy. The one model that was
constructed in the note taking condition was only one of the possible mod-
els, which resulted in a worse score for that problem type when compared
to the situation where note taking was not allowed. In the latter condition,
Figure 4. Experiment 1 mean scores in percentages for the notes group, by notes
taken, grade and problem type.
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the difficulty of even constructing one model might have led more partici-
pants to the correct ‘none of the above’ option, a hypothesis we will
explore in more detail later. In other words, taking notes seemed to
improve performance on the easier problems, whether by facilitating the
synthetisation of information, enhancing children’s focus and motivation,
and/or decreasing the working memory load. At the same time, it appeared
to prompt them to disregard multiple possibilities. This was especially true
for older children, presumably because note taking skills improve with age.
When plotting the scores, we can clearly see there is a cut-off at 16 for
the notes condition. This is because the best performing children scored
16/16 for the simple problems and 0/8 for the ones that required multiple
models. There was just one exception of a child that scored more than 16/
24, as illustrated in Figure 6.4 This was also the only participant in
Figure 5. Experiment 1 correct notes in percentages for the notes group when notes
taken, by grade and problem type.
4Plots were created using the ‘yarrr’ package (Phillips, 2017), adapted by means of code from
Stephen Politzer-Ahles, available at http://www.mypolyuweb.hk/sjpolit/Steve_functions.txt
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Experiment 1 that made multiple drawings which represented multiple pos-
sibilities. In the group that could not take notes, although their mean score
is lower, we see that some children did manage to understand the mul-
tiple-model cases and scored above 16/24.
One of our research goals was getting a better understanding of the
internal representation of our reasoners. For this reason we provided them
only with blank space and no instructions about how they could use it,
apart from stating that they could use it in any way they wanted. This way,
we wanted to see what kind of notes they would make spontaneously. It
turned out that they spontaneously drew analogical representations, with
drawings, words or letters representing the items, arranged on paper in the
same way as described in the premises. This arguably shows that they also
mentally used the same type of representations for solving these problems.
Their notes can be interpreted as an external representation of their mental
models. The ones that started out by drawing the items often switched to
more economical representations as the experiment proceeded. This was
likely because they grew tired of drawing unnecessary details but at the
Figure 6. Total scores in Exp 1 by notes groups. The plots show the total scores (out
of 24), with 1 point per child. Mean and 95% CI are indicated, as well as plot density
by total score.
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same time can have been functional as for mental reasoning activity visual
imagery can impede reasoning (Cf. Knauff & Johnson-Laird, 2002).
Our specific interest was in whether and how they would represent mul-
tiple possibilities. Given the results, it will not come as a big surprise that
not many children did represent multiple possibilities. Of the 96 children
that were in the notes condition, we only identified one who drew repre-
sentations of multiple possibilities multiple times, with three others drawing
them once. The sixth-grader who drew multiple models three times for
MMnv problems also correctly answered the corresponding questions, indi-
cating understanding of the multiple possibilities and scoring 19/24, i.e. cor-
rectly answering all 16 problems for which construction of one model was
sufficient plus three correct multiple-model cases with no valid conclusion.
Analysis of type of mistakes
We also analyzed the type of mistake the participants made. For the mul-
tiple-model problems with no valid conclusion, this was encoded in terms
of first-fit versus first-free-fit strategy, as introduced in Ragni et al. (2007)
and Ragni and Knauff (2013). We will briefly explain this with an example.
Consider the following model:
A B
If the next premise is ‘C is to the right of A’ and you only construct a sin-
gle model, you can either add C to the right of B or add C in between A
and B. The latter strategy is called the ‘first-fit’ (ff) strategy, while the former
is called the ‘first-free-fit’ (fff) strategy. According to Ragni et al. (2007), rea-
soners by default construct their preferred model according to the fff-strat-
egy, in which the items that were already present in the model are not
altered. In this theory, reasoners put items in adjacent ‘cells’ and prefer to
leave already placed items in their cell and use the first free cell. In the
example, you cannot know whether C is to the left or right of B, because
both are consistent with the information. However, if you have only con-
structed one model, you will draw an invalid conclusion. In case you con-
structed your model according to the ff-strategy, you will conclude that C is
to the left of B, while if you adopted the fff-strategy, you will conclude that
C is to the right of B. For all MMnv mistakes the children made, we looked
whether they made their error in the ff or the fff direction. We performed a
multilevel logistical regression, taking into account the individual partici-
pants as random intercept. Only for the fourth-graders that could take
notes was the result significant, as can be seen in Table 3.
Also for the problems with valid conclusion, the mistakes were analyzed. As
the correct solution for these problems was either left or right, the possible mis-
takes were now categorised as the ‘wrong’ option (left or right but incorrect)
and the ‘no valid conclusion (nvc)’ option. We performed a multilevel analysis,
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predicting the type of mistake from grade, notes condition and their inter-
action, with individual participants as random intercept. There was no signifi-
cant effect of notes (v2(1)¼0.03, p ¼ .870), which provides no evidence for an
alternative explanation, that children in the no notes condition generally
answered ‘no valid conclusion’ more often.5 There was, however, a significant
effect of grade (v2(1)¼10.02, p ¼ .002), with the younger children answering
nvc more often. This could partially explain why the younger children scored
better at the MMnv problems, viz. because they generally answered nvc more
often, potentially because they were less confident about their answer.
Wright and Smailes (2015) argued for the importance of considering gender
as an important factor in transitive reasoning. We exploratively performed a
separate analysis6, predicting score from notes, type and gender, with individual
participants as random intercept. For the grade six data, there was a significant
main effect of gender (v2(1)¼4.52, p¼.034), as well as a significant three-way
interaction between type, notes and gender (v2(2)¼9.19, p¼.010). When notes
were not allowed, girls were better at the problems with valid conclusion, while
the boys benefitted more from the ability to take notes for the problems with a
valid conclusion, as can be seen in Figure 7. For the grade four data, there was
no significant main effect of gender (v2(1)¼0.23, p¼.635), as can be seen in
Figure 8. No interactions with gender were significant either. Apparently, this
gender difference develops until after the age of nine. We will not speculate
here about the nature of this difference.
Experiment 2
Experiment 1 demonstrated that the children showed a strong preference for
only considering one possible state of affairs. When they could take notes, they
improved at this strategy, even in the cases where it was the wrong strategy. A
question that naturally arises from this result, is how we can stimulate them to
consider multiple possibilities. And when we succeed at this, it would be inter-
esting to see whether the children in the notes condition can also use their
notes to their benefit for the MMnv problems.
Table 3. MMnv mistakes in Experiment 1.
Condition Estimate Standard error Z p
4th grade, no notes 0.34 0.18 1.89 .058
6th grade, no notes 0.18 0.13 1.40 .163
4th grade, notes 0.56 0.28 2.01 .045
6th grade, notes 0.32 0.24 1.30 .193
5We thank an anonymous reviewer for this suggestion.
6Including ‘gender’ as a predictor in the main model proved to be too demanding to obtain a
good fit.
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In Experiment 2 we tried a very simple approach to reach this goal: we
added a multiple possibilities example to the example that the instructor pre-
sented before the experiment. This was a relatively minimal adaptation, but
now at least there was an example case in which it was shown that an object
could be either left or right of another object given certain information, whereas
the example in Experiment 1 only concerned a case with a definite answer.
Method
Participant info
We tested 132 children. There were 62 boys and 70 girls, 63 sixth-graders
(M¼ 11.42years, SD ¼ 0.25) and 69 third-graders (M¼ 8.29years, SD ¼ 0.25).
All data was again collected at schools in Flanders, different from those of
Experiment 1. All children’s data was anonymized before processing. The ethical
approval and informed consent were identical to those of Experiment 1.
Among the third-graders, 34 children were assigned to the control condition
Figure 7. Experiment 1 mean scores in percentages for the sixth-graders by gender,
notes group, and problem type.
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and 35 to the experimental condition. Among the sixth-graders, 31 and 32 chil-
dren were in the control and experimental condition, respectively.
Procedure and material
The procedure and material were identical to that of Experiment 1, with the
already explained exception that the instructor now also showed the chil-
dren an example with multiple possibilities.
Results and discussion
Effect of type, notes and grade on accuracy
The same analysis as in Experiment 1 was performed. The R2 of the entire
model was .43 (based on the theoretical variance) and .38 (based on the
observation-level variance). If we only look at the fixed effects, the R2 esti-
mates were .35 and .31, respectively. Again, there was a significant three-
way interaction between notes, grade, and problem type (v2(2) ¼ 13.28, p
¼ .001, see Figure 9).
Figure 8. Experiment 1 mean scores in percentages for the fourth-graders by gender,
notes group, and problem type.
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It does seem that the explicit mentioning of the cases with multiple pos-
sibilities had its effect. For Grade 6 participants taking notes resulted in sig-
nificantly better results for the problems where one model was sufficient,
as in Experiment 1. More important, however, is the effect of our manipula-
tion on the MMnv problems. In Experiment 1 those taking notes performed
significantly worse at the MMnv problems, while in the current experiment
this was not the case. In fact, there was a slight benefit of taking notes for
those problems as well now. For the Grade 3 participants, there was only a
significant difference between the notes and no notes conditions for the
MMv problems. See Tables 4 and 5 for more details on the effect of note
taking. Showing children the multiple possibilities actually wiped out the
benefits of notetaking in third-graders, presumably because the mechanism
of taking notes to represent mental models was too difficult for them,
requiring some level of meta-cognition that they do not yet master and
therefore confusing them. Kennedy and Lodge (2016) showed that confu-
sion can be associated with blockages or impasses in the learning process
Figure 9. Experiment 2 mean scores in percentages by notes group, grade and prob-
lem type.
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(see also D’Mello et al., 2014). Of course, in our experiment, learning and
testing happened at the same time. In the framework of desirable difficul-
ties (see e.g., Bjork & Bjork, 2011), it has been shown that difficulties can
reliably enhance learning in the long run. Overcoming misconceptions can
precede the development of a more sophisticated understanding of the
topic area. This might partly explain the difference between our youngest
groups in Experiment 1 and 2. It might also be interesting to see what hap-
pens if the same participant would be retested some time later.
The cut-off for the highest scores at 16/24 for the notes group, that was
observed in Experiment 1, now was less outspoken, with multiple children
providing correct answers to the MMnv problems and achieving a higher
total score, as can be observed in Figure 10.
More detailed analysis of the note taking
The note-taking behaviour in Experiment 2 showed rougly similar patterns
to Experiment 1, but with notable differences. Notes were taken in 70% of
the cases, with a mere 56% for the third-graders and 85% for the sixth-
graders. The distribution of amount of notes taken can be seen in Figure
11. Of the notes taken, 85% were correct. Third-graders took correct notes
in 76% of the cases, while sixth-graders did so in 91% of the cases. Of these
correct notes, 98% were complete (third-graders 97% and sixth-graders
99%). Of the 747 occasions in which notes were actually taken for multiple
model problems, now 76 (i.e. 10%, versus 0.49% in Experiment 1) showed
information that we interpreted as representing multiple models. Again,
the comparison between the cases in which notes were taken and those in
which notes were not taken showed a similar pattern as when comparing
the cases in which notes were allowed with those in which notes were not
allowed, as can be observed in Figure 12. Analyses are again based on
multilevel models with individual participants as random intercept.
Whether the notes taken were correct or not significantly predicted the
score for the problems (v2(1) ¼ 51.53, p < .001). The interaction with prob-
lem type was not significant this time (v2(2) ¼ 5.62, p ¼ .060). Sixth-graders
had significantly more correct notes than third-graders (v2(1) ¼ 9.19, p ¼
.002), as pictured in Figure 13. Whether notes were taken or not did not
Table 4. Effect of note taking for each problem type by grade combination in
Experiment 2.
Problem type Grade Estimate Standard error Z p
M1_v 6 1.95 0.33 5.92 < .001
MM_v 6 0.81 0.27 2.97 .003
MM_nv 6 0.54 0.27 1.98 .048
M1_v 3 0.10 0.24 0.42 .675
MM_v 3 0.52 0.24 2.15 .031
MM_nv 3 0.47 0.32 1.46 .144
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depend on problem type (v2(2) ¼ 0.77, p ¼ .681), but did depend on prob-
lem order (v2(1) ¼ 36.45, p < .001), with less notes taken on later problems.
Items were again mostly represented by words, followed by drawings, fol-
lowed by a combination of both and exceptionally initial letters or symbols,
as can be seen in Figure 14.
The improved scores for Experiment 2 are not just random noise. When
combining the data of the sixth-graders from both experiments, we see a
significant interaction of experiment with problem type (v2(2) ¼ 9.14, p ¼
.010). The contrasts in Table 6 show that sixth-graders in Experiment 2 score
significantly higher for each problem type, compared to those in
Experiment 1.
The notes they made were very similar to those in Experiment 1: ana-
logical representations of the spatially ordered items. Out of 67 participants
Table 5. Differential effect of note taking across grade for each problem type in
Experiment 2.
Problem type Estimate Standard error Z p
M1_v 1.85 0.41 4.52 < .001
MM_v 0.29 0.36 0.79 .430
MM_nv 1.02 0.42 2.39 .017
Figure 10. Total scores in Exp 2 by notes groups.
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in the notes condition, nine drew representations of multiple possibilities.
Remarkably, all but one did not draw multiple models but a single model in
which they indicated in some way that there were multiple possibilities, for
example by using arrows, arcs or representing an item twice. This way of
representing multiple possibilities in a single model has been coined an
‘isomeric model’ in Schaeken et al. (2007). With so few children represent-
ing multiple possibilities, we cannot draw any conclusions here, but it may
be worthwhile to investigate whether reasoners, and children specifically,
prefer these isomeric representations over multiple models.
Analysis of type of mistakes
Looking at the MMnv mistakes, we see, in Table 7, that there were no sig-
nificant preferences for either fff or ff mistakes, when taking into account
the random effect of the individual participants.
As for Experiment 1, we analyzed the mistakes for the valid conclusion
problems separately, with a multilevel analysis, predicting the type of mis-
take from grade, notes condition and their interaction, with individual par-
ticipants as random intercept. There were no significant effects, neither of
notes (v2(1)¼2.90, p ¼ .089) nor grade (v2(1)¼0.00, p ¼ .951), excluding an
alternative explanation in terms of systematically more ‘nvc’ answers.
Finally, for Experiment 2, there was no significant main effect of gender,
nor for the sixth-graders (v2(1)¼0.15, p¼.696), nor for the third-graders
Figure 11. Frequency distribution of total amount of notes taken in experiment 2.
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(v2(1)¼0.02, p¼.895), as can be seen in Figures 15 and 16, respectively.
There was, however, a significant interaction between type and gender for
the third-graders (v2(2)¼20.40, p¼< .001). The three-way interaction type-
notes-gender for the third-graders (v2(2)¼5.14, p¼.076) and for the sixth-
graders (v2(2)¼5.86, p¼.053) approached significance.
General discussion
The first research goal we defined, was to specify the effect of working
memory on relational reasoning. For problems that could be solved by
means of a single mental model, we found what was expected: alleviating
the weight on working memory results in better performance. For problems
where considering multiple models is required, the situation is more com-
plicated. The commonly accepted explanation of why people do not vary
upon their preferred mental model, is the principle of parsimony, which is
explained in terms of limited working memory capacity (Goodwin &
Figure 12. Experiment 2 mean scores in percentages for the notes group, by notes
taken, grade and problem type.
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Johnson-Laird, 2005; Jahn et al., 2007; Markovits & Barrouillet, 2002). In light
of our results, it is worth reconsidering this explanation. By allowing our
participants to use paper and pencil, we provided them with a mechanism
to overcome the limitations of working memory. This had the expected
result for the reasoning problems in which varying the preferred model was
not required: the children who could take notes performed significantly
better. The best explanation for this indeed seems to be in terms of work-
ing memory capacity. Now, if the reason why people do not vary their pre-
ferred model is limited working memory capacity, we would especially
expect an improvement for those problems in which varying their preferred
model is required. However, we saw a reversed effect (Experiment 1) or
only a slight improvement (Experiment 2). This suggests that working mem-
ory capacity in itself cannot be the sole motivation why reasoners choose
to refrain from constructing multiple models.
A first plausible alternative explanation is insufficient inhibitory control.
Once one mental representation, consistent with the premises, is
Figure 13. Experiment 2 correct notes in percentages for the notes group when
notes taken, by grade and problem type.
22 K. DEMIDDELE ET AL.
constructed, inhibitory control is required to not halt calculations and instead
look for further possibilities. An additional reason, then, why people do not
vary their preferred mental model, is lack of inhibitory control. It could be
that the requirements on inhibitory control are even tougher when this first
mental model is written out on paper. The children could see a consistent
representation of the information in front of them but still had to resist the
temptation of thinking ‘I found it’ and answering the question. This explan-
ation is in line with the effect described by Begolli and Richland (2016), that
sequentially presented alternative representations can pose a high burden
on the executive functioning system and require participants to inhibit atten-
tion effortfully. As working memory capacity and inhibitory control are corre-
lated and both are good predictors of reasoning performance (Handley et al.,
Figure 14. Type of notes taken in experiment 2.
Table 6. Differential effect of experiment for each problem type for sixth-graders.
Experiment Problem type Estimate Standard error Z p
1 2 M1_v 1.05 0.16 6.52 < .001
1 2 MM_v 0.62 0.15 4.06 < .001
1 2 MM_nv 1.16 0.17 6.72 < .001
Table 7. MMnv mistakes in Experiment 2.
Condition Estimate Standard error Z p
3rd grade, no notes 0.06 0.15 0.39 .695
6th grade, no notes 0.13 0.28 0.45 .654
3rd grade, notes 0.23 0.18 1.25 .212
6th grade, notes 0.77 0.45 1.71 .086
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2004), an explanation in terms of working memory capacity can easily seem
plausible when in fact inhibitory control is also part of the explanation. With
our manipulation, we may have managed to positively influence working
memory capacity without positively influencing inhibitory control, which, in
combination with the problem types, sheds more clarity on the role of each
of these executive functions. Handley et al. (2004) suggested that inhibitory
control was mostly important when dealing with prior knowledge, when
beliefs need to be ignored. In our experiments this was not the case, but still
inhibitory control seems essential for the specific reasoning aspect of varying
preferred models. Its importance for reasoning performance could weigh in
heavier than previously assumed.
A second alternative explanation, both compatible with an account in
terms of working memory and in terms of inhibitory control, concerns
rational thinking dispositions. According to Stanovich and West (1998), a
thinking disposition is best seen as a cognitive style that is more malleable,
with rational thinking dispositions being those related to reasoning. The
Figure 15. Experiment 2 mean scores in percentages for the sixth-graders by gender,
notes group, and problem type.
24 K. DEMIDDELE ET AL.
advantage of an interpretation in terms of rational thinking dispositions is
that it can also explain the difference between the results of Experiment 1
and 2. There is no reason to assume that the capacities of working memory
and inhibitory control of the children in Experiment 1 were different than
those in Experiment 2. But our slightly more elaborate instruction in
Experiment 2, with the explicit mention of multiple possibilities, may have
changed their propensity to consider alternatives. That is what is meant by
the ‘malleability’ of thinking dispositions: “Although you cannot improve
working memory by instruction, you can tell someone to spend more time
on problems before she gives up, and if she is so inclined, she can do what
you say” (Baron, 1985, p.15). Rational thinking dispositions come in many
different flavours. ‘Consideration of alternatives’, mentioned by Markovits
and Barrouillet (2002), seems particularly apt for capturing the effect we are
after, with ‘actively open-minded thinking’ a more general candidate that
could carry the load (Cf. Baron, 1985, 1993; Stanovich & West, 1998; Toplak
et al., 2014).
Figure 16. Experiment 2 mean scores in percentages for the third-graders by gender,
notes group, and problem type.
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A third alternative or complementary explanation could concern context
monitoring (Cf. Chatham et al., 2012). When children are constructing only
one model, rather than impulsively aborting further reasoning once one
model is constructed, what they may be failing to do is appropriately moni-
tor for cues that would tell them whether another model is possible. The
instructions in Experiment 2 may have prompted such monitoring, by high-
lighting for children that they will need to distinguish between cases with
and without valid conclusions.
In summary, differences in working memory load can explain the
improved performance on M1 and MMv problems in the notes condition in
both experiments, inhibitory control can explain the difficulties with the
MMnv problem type and the rational thinking disposition responsible for
consideration of alternatives and/or context monitoring can explain the
improved results for the MMnv problem type in Experiment 2. Evidently,
this interpretation is a line of thought that will require further research
before strong claims can be made. More specifically, measuring these varia-
bles and seeing how well they predict the score on MMnv problems will
be needed.
The second research goal, a more detailed understanding of reasoners’
internal representation, can be answered with a much clearer picture. Our
young participants spontaneously drew iconic representations of the spa-
tially organised items. It seems plausible that their internal strategy for solv-
ing the reasoning problems is also based on such representations, rather
than on a logical strategy involving, for example, understanding of the tran-
sitivity of the relation ‘is to the left of’. Making abstraction of whether the
iconic representations were drawn with images, words or letters, we can
interpret them as mental models and interpret our results as supporting
mental model theory.
Finally, our third research goal was obtaining a developmental perspec-
tive. It is clear that children get better at reasoning with one representation
as they grow older. Less clear is whether their understanding of multiple
models improves a lot at the ages we tested. In Experiment 1, the sixth-
graders scored worse than the fourth-graders on the MMnv problems. The
sixth-graders in Experiment 2 scored a bit better, but still only at chance
level. So the extent to which they understand multiple possibilities is not
that clear. One hypothesis is that producing multiple models themselves is
still too challenging for them, although they may be capable of understand-
ing the concept when it is explained to them. What is clear, is that our
third-, fourth- and sixth-graders spontaneously use iconic representations
and that a strong bias for ignoring multiple possibilities is present. In
Experiment 1, only three out of 96 children drew multiple models. In com-
parison, Ragni et al. (2007) found that 10% of adult participants drew mul-
tiple models in a similar task.
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We did not find a significant preference for the fff-strategy, which con-
sists of adding an item to the model while leaving the relative positions of
the already represented items unchanged, when taking into account the
random effect of individual participants. It could be argued that such pref-
erence develops with age, as we found a maximal percentage of 63% fff-
mistakes for the sixth-graders in the notes condition, whereas Ragni et al.
(2007) found a 78% percentage for adult reasoners. Computationally mod-
elling this as the default behaviour, as done in Ragni and Knauff (2013),
may be overstating this effect, at least for modelling the behaviour of
young reasoners.
A remarkable result was the (non-significant) preference for the ff-strat-
egy among fourth-graders in the no notes condition in Experiment 1. Ragni
et al. (2007) mention a possible linguistic explanation for such preference:
‘to the left of’ can be interpreted as ‘immediately to the left of’. This inter-
pretation results in the ff-strategy when adding items to the model. Still, it
remains unclear why only our fourth-graders in the control condition would
prefer this interpretation. The first-free-fit strategy is based upon analogy
with writing down items in cells and then looking for the first free cell.
Changing items from cell is mentally costly. Although we did not provide
our participants with cells, it does not come as a surprise that this strategy
was adopted more in the notes condition than in the condition without
notes. When writing down items, even on a blank space, each item takes
up a certain amount of space. We could regard this as virtual cells. Writing
a third item next to two existing items is easier than writing it in between
them, especially when there is not much space left. The mental cost as
postulated by the preferred mental model theory is as such mirrored to
some extent in the cost to squeeze in a third item in between two items
that were represented as being next to each other. Sometimes children
needed to write such a third item very small or had to erase one of the
other ones and write it elsewhere, an action that can be interpreted as
changing the item’s cell.
One limitation of this study is that we did not measure inhibitory control
and open-minded thinking, which would have allowed to check for correla-
tions with varying the preferred model and answering MMnv problems cor-
rectly. A second limitation was the third answering option. The third
multiple-choice option was ‘none of the above’. This is the correct answer if
you interpret the question as ‘what can you validly conclude from these
premises?’. As a descriptive statement, however, it is incorrect: the answer
is either left or right, even if one cannot know which is the case based on
the information in the premises. In retrospect, this should have been stated
more clearly. However, the children were clearly instructed that this was
the option to choose if they thought there were multiple possibilities or if
they had the feeling there was no correct answer. A third limitation is the
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fact that no response times were collected. As the test was conducted on
paper, it was not possible to do this per exercise, but maybe total times
could at least have been registered. This would have been useful to com-
pare the total time on task spent by the children in both conditions. Longer
time spent on problems might be part of the reason why some children
were more successful or simply more engaged with the problem. However,
practical considerations prompted us to not record response times: measur-
ing times with a chronometer might not be that reliable and switching to a
computer version of our experiment might have made the note taking less
natural. A fourth limitation was varying the age of the younger children. It
would have been better to stick to fourth-graders for Experiment 2 as well,
in order to be able to compare consistently with Experiment 1.
Conclusion
We ran two reasoning experiments in which school children of two different
age groups each solved 24 reasoning exercises. The control groups just had
to choose the correct conclusion from three different options, while the
experimental groups additionally had some blank space where they could
make helpful notes before choosing their answer. In the first experiment, we
observed a strong tendency to construct only a single model, resulting in a
much lower score for the multiple-model problems with no valid conclusion,
for which taking into account multiple possibilities is required to arrive at the
correct answer. Understanding these multiple possibilities proved to be
rather challenging for our young participants, even for the oldest ones and
with the help of notes and some concise explanation. Taking notes was use-
ful to improve their single-model strategy, which explains why in the notes
condition accuracy was higher for the M1 and MMv problems, but signifi-
cantly lower for the MMnv problems. Likewise, sixth-graders had lower scores
than fourth-graders on these problems, because they were better at applying
the preferred model strategy. In an attempt to overcome this preferred
model bias, we explicitly showed them a multiple-model example with no
valid conclusion in the second experiment, thus subtly explaining the pre-
ferred model mistake. This had some beneficial effect, but understanding of
the multiple-model cases was still surprisingly low.
Based on these results, we argued that the reason why people do not
vary their preferred model, is not only because of working memory consider-
ations. Taking notes should be a substantial help on the working memory
front, but did not yield very beneficial results when it comes to varying the
preferred model. So parsimonious use of working memory cannot be the
only reason why participants tend to be satisfied with one mental model,
even in cases where multiple ones are possible. With inhibitory control, an
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open-minded thinking disposition and context monitoring, we suggested
three other possible causes of variability for this trait. To what extent each
of these four causes come into play, may well depend on the exact reason-
ing circumstances. Moreover, as the causes are likely to be correlated, disen-
tangling their respective influences will require experimental care. Our
results cast doubt on wether preferred model bias exists in young reasoners,
suggest that producing representations of multiple possibilities is by no
means evident until the age of twelve, and that the principle of parsimony
for mental model construction in itself is not sufficient to explain it.
Acknowledgements
Earlier versions of this study were presented at the ‘Thinking About the Possible’
Summer School, Central European University, Budapest, 9-14 July 2018 and at the
Potsdam Research Institute for Early Learning & Educational Action Conference,
Potsdam, Germany, 4-5 October 2018. We thank the various researchers that came
to discuss our ideas and provided inspiring comments and questions. We would
like to offer special thanks to Tessa Wittock and Lore Mivis for collecting the data
and to Stef Herregods for his assistance with data processing.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
Authors’ contributions
W.S. and K.D. conceived of the presented idea. W.S. and K.D. developed the theory,
conceived and planned the experiments. K.D. and T.H. analysed the data. K.D. took
the lead in writing the manuscript. All authors provided critical feedback and
helped shape the research, analysis and manuscript. T.H. was a Postdoctoral Fellow
of the Research Foundation-Flanders (FWO-Vlaanderen) at the start of this project.
K.D.’s funding came from the C1 project BOF (C14/17/043).
Funding
This article was supported by Bijzonder Onderzoeksfonds, Fonds
Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek.
References
Ameel, E., Verschueren, N., & Schaeken, W. (2007). The relevance of selecting what’s
relevant: A dual process approach to transitive reasoning with spatial relations.
Thinking & Reasoning, 13(2), 164–187. http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.
1080/13546780600780671
THINKING & REASONING 29
Andrews, G., & Halford, G. S. (1998). Children’s ability to make transitive inferences:
The importance of premise integration and structural complexity. Cognitive
Development, 13(4), 479–513. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0885-2014(98)90004-1
Bara, B. G., Bucciarelli, M., & Johnson-Laird, P. N. (1995). Development of syllogistic
reasoning. The American Journal of Psychology, 108(2), 157–193.
Baron, J. (1985). Rationality and intelligence. Cambridge University press.
Baron, J. (1993). Why teach thinking?—An essay. Applied Psychology: An International
Review, 42(3), 191–214.
Bauer, M. I., & Johnson-Laird, P. N. (1993). How diagrams can improve reasoning.
Psychological Science, 4(6), 372–378. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9280.1993.
tb00584.x
Begolli, K. N., & Richland, L. E. (2016). Teaching mathematics by comparison: Analog
visibility as a double-edged sword. Journal of Educational Psychology, 108(2),
194–213. https://doi.org/10.1037/edu0000056
Bjork, E. L., & Bjork, R. A. (2011). Making things hard on yourself, but in a good way:
Creating desirable difficulties to enhance learning. In M. A. Gernsbacher R. W. Pew
& J. R. Pomerantzf (Eds.), Psychology and the real world: Essays illustrating funda-
mental contributions to society. (pp. 59–68). Worth Publishers.
Braine, M. D. (1978). On the relation between the natural logic of reasoning and
standard logic. Psychological Review, 85(1), 1–21.
Bucciarelli, M., & Johnson-Laird, P. N. (1999). Strategies in syllogistic reasoning.
Cognitive Science, 23(3), 247–303. https://doi.org/10.1207/s15516709cog2303_1
Chatham, C. H., Claus, E. D., Kim, A., Curran, T., Banich, M. T., & Munakata, Y. (2012).
Cognitive control reflects context monitoring, not motoric stopping, in response
inhibition. PloS One., 7(2), e31546. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0031546
D’Mello, S., Lehman, B., Pekrun, R., & Graesser, A. (2014). Confusion can be beneficial
for learning. Learning and Instruction, 29, 153–170.
Fodor, J. A. (1975). The language of thought. Crowell.
Fodor, J. A. (1983). Modularity of mind. MIT Press.
Gathercole, S. E., Pickering, S. J., Ambridge, B., & Wearing, H. (2004). The structure of
working memory from 4 to 15 years of age. Developmental Psychology, 40(2),
177–190. https://doi.org/10.1037/0012-1649.40.2.177
Gilhooly, K., Logie, R., Wetherick, N., & Wynn, V. (1992). Working memory and strategies
in syllogistic reasoning tasks. International Journal of Psychology, 27(3-4), 148–148.
Goodwin, G. P., & Johnson-Laird, P. N. (2005). Reasoning about relations. Psychological
Review, 112(2), 468–493. https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-295X.112.2.468
Handley, S. J., Capon, A., Beveridge, M., Dennis, I., & Evans, J. S. B. (2004). Working
memory, inhibitory control and the development of children’s reasoning. Thinking
& Reasoning, 10(2), 175–195.
Inhelder, J., & Piaget, B. (1958). The growth of logical thinking from childhood to ado-
lescence: An essay on the construction of formal operational structures. Routledge &
Kegan Paul.
Jahn, G., Knauff, M., & Johnson-Laird, P. N. (2007). Preferred mental models in reason-
ing about spatial relations. Memory & Cognition, 35(8), 2075–2087. https://doi.org/
10.3758/bf03192939
Johnson-Laird, P. N. (1983). Mental models: Towards a cognitive science of language,
inference, and consciousness. Harvard university press.
Johnson-Laird, P. N. (2006). How we reason. Oxford University Press.
Kennedy, G., & Lodge, J. M. (2016). All roads lead to rome: Tracking students’ affect
as they overcome misconceptions. In A. P. S. Barker S. Dawson & C. Colvin (Eds.),
Show Me the Learning. Proceedings ASCILITE 2016. (pp. 318–328). SA.
30 K. DEMIDDELE ET AL.
Klauer, K. C. (1997). Working memory involvement in propositional and spatial rea-
soning. Thinking & Reasoning, 3(1), 9–47.
Knauff, M., & Johnson-Laird, P. N. (2002). Visual imagery can impede reasoning.
Memory & Cognition, 30(3), 363–371. https://doi.org/10.3758/bf03194937
Manktelow, K. (1999). Reasoning and thinking. Psychology Press.
Markovits, H., & Barrouillet, P. (2002). The development of conditional reasoning: A
mental model account. Developmental Review, 22(1), 5–36. https://doi.org/10.
1006/drev.2000.0533
Markovits, H., Dumas, C., & Malfait, N. (1995). Understanding transitivity of a spatial
relationship - a developmental analysis. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology,
59(1), 124–141. https://doi.org/10.1006/jecp.1995.1005
Nakagawa, S., Johnson, P. C. D., & Schielzeth, H. (2017). The coefficient of determin-
ation r2 and intra-class correlation coefficient from generalized linear mixed-
effects models revisited and expanded. Journal of the Royal Society, Interface,
14(134). http://search.proquest.com/docview/1938853354/
Pears, R., & Bryant, P. (1990). TRANSITIVE inferences by young-children about spatial
position. British Journal of Psychology, 81(4), 497–510. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.
2044-8295.1990.tb02375.x
Phillips, N. (2017). Yarrr: A companion to the e-book “yarrr!: The pirate’s guide to r”.
https://CRAN.R-project.org/package=yarrr
Ragni, M., & Knauff, M. (2013). A theory and a computational model of spatial rea-
soning with preferred mental models. Psychological Review , 120(3), 561–588.
https://doi.org/10.1037/a0032460
Ragni, M., Fangmeier, T., Webber, L., & Knauff, M. (2007). Preferred mental models:
How and why they are so important in human reasoning with spatial relations. In
Lecture notes in computer science (including subseries lecture notes in artificial
intelligence and lecture notes in bioinformatics) (Vol. 4387, pp. 175–190).
Rips, L. J. (1983). Cognitive processes in propositional reasoning. Psychological
Review, 90(1), 38–71.
Schaeken, W., Van Der Henst, J.-B., & Schroyens, W. (2007). The mental models theory
of relational reasoning: Premises’ relevance, conclusions’ phrasing, and cognitive
economy. In W. S. W. Schaeken A. Vandierendonck (Ed.), The mental models theory
of reasoning: Refinements and extensions (pp. 129–149). Erlbaum.
Stanovich, K. E., & West, R. F. (1998). Individual differences in rational thought.
Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 127(2), 161–188. https://doi.org/10.
1037/0096-3445.127.2.161
Toplak, M. E., West, R. F., & Stanovich, K. E. (2014). Rational thinking and cognitive
sophistication: Development, cognitive abilities, and thinking dispositions.
Developmental Psychology, 50(4), 1037–1048. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0034910
Van der Henst, J.-B., Yang, Y., & Johnson-Laird, P. N. (2002). Strategies in sentential
reasoning. Cognitive Science, 26(4), 425–468. https://doi.org/10.1207/
s15516709cog2604_2
Wright, B. C. (2001). Reconceptualizing the transitive inference ability: A framework
for existing and future research. Developmental Review, 21(4), 375–422.
Wright, B. C., & Smailes, J. (2015). Factors and processes in children’s transitive
deductions. Journal of Cognitive Psychology (Hove, England)), 27(8), 967–978.
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/20445911.2015.1063641 https://doi.
org/10.1080/20445911.2015.1063641
THINKING & REASONING 31
